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CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Andrew P. Sherrod *
I. INTRODUCTION
This article surveys recent and significant developments in
Virginia civil practice and procedure. Specifically, the article dis-
cusses selected opinions of the Supreme Court of Virginia from
September 2011 through June 2012, addressing new or meaning-
ful civil procedure topics; significant amendments to the Rules of
the Supreme Court of Virginia concerning procedural issues dur-
ing the same period; and legislation enacted by the Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly during the 2012 session that relates to civil prac-
tice.
II. DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF VIRGINIA
A. Nonsuits
In Laws v. Mclroy, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
the interpretation of Virginia Code section 8.01-229(E)(3), which
sets forth the tolling rule for applying the statute of limitations in
nonsuited cases.1 In Laws, an auto accident case,2 the plaintiffs
submitted nonsuit orders to the circuit court on January 8, 2010,
which were rejected due to a lack of endorsement but were re-
submitted fully endorsed on January 28 and entered by the cir-
cuit court on February 4, 2010.' On January 19, following sub-
mission of the original nonsuit orders but prior to their eventual
entry by the court, the plaintiffs filed second identical suits in the
* Principal, Hirschler Fleischer, P.C., Richmond, Virginia. J.D., 2000, University of
North Carolina at Chapel Hill School of Law; B.A., 1996, Hampden-Sydney College.
1. 283 Va. 594, 599, 724 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2012) (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01.
229(E)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2012)).
2. Id. at 596, 724 S.E.2d at 700.
3. See id. at 597, 724 S.E.2d at 701.
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same court.4 The defendants sought dismissal as to the second
suits on the grounds that they were time-barred and that the toll-
ing provisions in section 8.01-229(E)(3) did not apply. The trial
court agreed.6
On appeal, while conceding that the suits were brought past
the two-year statute of limitations,7 the plaintiffs contended that
the dismissals were improper because the suits were filed within
six months of the nonsuit and, therefore, were timely under the
tolling provision of section 8.01-229(E)(3),' which states in rele-
vant part:
If a plaintiff suffers a voluntary nonsuit as prescribed in § 8.01-380,
the statute of limitations with respect to such action shall be tolled
by the commencement of the nonsuited action, and the plaintiff may
recommence his action within six months from the date of the order
entered by the court, or within the original period of limitation, or
within the limitation period as provided by subdivision B 1, which-
ever period is longer.
9
The plaintiffs argued that because the statute does not say "fol-
lowing" or "after" the nonsuit order but rather "within" six
months of the order, the second suits were timely under the stat-
ute.10 Agreeing with this argument, the supreme court also high-
lighted the language of the statue allowing a plaintiff to "recom-
mence" the action within six months "from" the date of the order."
According to the court, the word "from" indicates a "starting
point" but does not require that the point be forward in time as
opposed to backward. As a result, the supreme court found that
the plain language of the statute allowed for the filing within six
months either before or after the nonsuit order and reversed the
decision of the trial court."
In a lengthy dissent joined by Chief Justice Kinser and Justice
McClanahan, Justice Millett criticized the majority for amending
4. Id.
5. Id. at 597-98, 724 S.E.2d at 701.
6. See id. at 598, 724 S.E.2d at 701.
7. Id. at 597-98, 724 S.E.2d at 701.
8. See id. at 600, 724 S.E.2d at 702.
9. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(3) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Supp. 2012) (emphasis added).
10. 283 Va. at 600, 724 S.E.2d at 702.
11. Id. (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(3)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
12. 283 Va. at 601, 724 S.E.2d at 703 (internal quotation marks omitted).
13. Id. at 603, 724 S.E.2d at 704.
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the statute through a strained interpretation to avoid an appar-
ently unfair result.4 In Justice Millette's interpretation of the
provision, the General Assembly meant for section 8.01-229(E)(3)
to apply to situations where a plaintiff files a second action af-
ter-not before-the entry of the order nonsuiting the first case.15
Nevertheless, unless and until the General Assembly addresses
the issues through an amendment to the provision, litigants will
be able to take advantage of the six-month tolling window either
before or after the nonsuit order is entered.6
B. Evidence
A number of recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Virginia
have touched upon evidentiary issues. In Arnold v. Wallace, the
supreme court addressed the applicability of the hearsay rule's
business records exception to medical records that contain opin-
ions.' 7 At the trial of the auto accident case, 8 the defendant intro-
duced the plaintiffs medical records through her treating physi-
cian, who testified that they were records regularly kept in the
normal course of his practice.19 Plaintiffs counsel objected to the
introduction of the records containing medical observations re-
garding the plaintiff on the ground of lack of "business records
foundation."0
On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court erred by
admitting the records because the defendant had not established
the elements of the business records exception to the hearsay
rule-in particular the requirement that the records contain fac-
tual statements and not medical opinion.2' In rejecting the plain-
tiffs argument, the supreme court noted that it is not required
that "the party offering a document for admission under the busi-
ness records exception establish that all of the entries therein are
factual in nature and contain no opinions."22 Thus, while the
14. See id. at 607, 724 S.E.2d at 706 (Millette, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 608, 724 S.E.2d at 707.
16. See id. at 603, 724 S.E.2d at 704 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(3)).
17. See 283 Va. 709, 713-14, 725 S.E.2d 539, 541-42 (2012).
18. Id. at 709, 725 S.E.2d at 539.
19. Id. at 712, 725 S.E.2d at 541.
20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
21. Id. at 713, 725 S.E.2d at 541.
22. Id. at 714, 725 S.E.2d at 542.
2012]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
plaintiff may have had a valid objection to the admission of the
medical opinions contained within the records pursuant to a prior
decision of the court, the plaintiffs "foundation" objection was not
sufficient to apprise the trial court of that basis for objection and
therefore waived pursuant to Rule 5:25.23
The Arnold decision also addressed an expert issue. As a se-
cond assignment of error, the plaintiff objected to the trial court's
allowing the defendant to put on an expert witness who was a
member of the same medical practice group as another doctor the
plaintiff had consulted as potential expert.24 During voir dire ex-
amination, the defendant's expert testified that the doctor the
plaintiff had consulted did not share any confidential information
with him but instead simply provided the medical records and a
copy of his expert designation." The medical records contained
some handwritten notes, but the expert testified that he did not
know whose notes they were, and there was no showing that the
notes contained any confidential information provided by the
plaintiff." The supreme court noted that it was the plaintiffs
burden to show that the previous physician had revealed confi-
dential information to the expert the plaintiff sought to disquali-
fy. 7 As no such showing was made, the court held that the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the testimony."
The Supreme Court of Virginia also addressed the applicability
of the hearsay rule to prior consistent statements in two cases de-
cided on the same day.29 In Ruhlin v. Samaan, a personal injury
case,30 there was a question whether the plaintiff had experienced
23. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The court agreed with the defendant that
pursuant to Neely v. Johnson, the presence of an opinion within the business record was
an independent ground for objection. Id.; see also Neely v. Johnson, 215 Va. 565, 572, 211
S.E.2d 100, 106 (1975). As that aspect of the objection was not raised sufficiently at trial,
it was waived. Arnold, 283 Va. at 714, 725 S.E.2d at 542; see also VA. SuP. CT. R. pt. 5, R.
5:25 (Repl. Vol. 2012) ("No ruling of the trial court ... will be considered as a basis for re-
versal unless an objection was stated with reasonable certainty at the time of the ruling,
except for good cause shown or to enable [the supreme court] to attain the ends of jus-
tice.").
24. Arnold, 283 Va. at 715, 725 S.E.2d at 542.
25. Id., 725 S.E.2d at 543.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 716, 725 S.E.2d at 543.
28. Id.
29. See Ruhlin v. Samaan, 282 Va. 371, 380-81, 718 S.E.2d 447, 451-52 (2011); An-
derson v. Commonwealth, 282 Va. 457, 463-65, 717 S.E.2d 623, 626-27 (2011).
30. 282 Va. at 374, 717 S.E.2d at 448.
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shoulder pain prior to the car accident in question.31 When cross-
examined about inconsistent statements given in a recorded tele-
phone interview with the defendant insurance company, the
plaintiff did not recall certain details of the conversation.32 The
defendant then used the transcript of the recorded conversation
to refresh his recollection over the objection of plaintiffs counsel.3
Following cross-examination, the plaintiff called his wife to testify
regarding prior consistent statements he made regarding his in-
juries in the accident by contending that such testimony was ap-
propriate to "rebut the defense's allegation of recent fabrication,"34
but the trial court sustained the defendant's objection.5
On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the use of the recorded
transcript ran afoul of Virginia Code section 8.01-404, which lim-
its the use of prior inconsistent statements to contradict witness-
es in personal injury suits. 6 Disagreeing with the plaintiff, the
court held that the witness could be properly cross-examined on
the content of the oral statements made during the telephone
conversation so long as the writing itself was not used to impeach
the witness. 37 The court found that the written transcript had not
been used to impeach the witness but rather to refresh the wit-
ness's recollection about the conversation and thus was not im-
proper under section 8.02-404.28 Significantly, the defendant's
counsel "did not introduce the transcript into evidence, quote it in
open court, or even identify it to the jury. 39
On the subject of prior consistent statements, the court noted
that they are inadmissible hearsay if offered for the truth of the
matter asserted but can be admitted in certain limited circum-
stances for rehabilitating a witness.40 The plaintiff contended that
31. Id. at 375, 718 S.E.2d at 448.
32. Id. at 375-76, 718 S.E.2d at 448-49.
33. Id. at 376, 718 S.E.2d at 449.
34. Id. at 377, 718 S.E.2d at 449.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 377-78, 718 S.E.2d at 450.
37. See id. at 380, 718 S.E.2d at 451.
38. Id.; see also Burns v. Gagnon, 283 Va. 657, 681, 727 S.E.2d 634, 648-49 (2012)
(quoting Ruhlin and finding trial court did not abuse discretion in admitting deposition
testimony during which the witness's recollection was refreshed by reference to an affida-
vit she previously signed).
39. 282 Va. at 379-80, 718 S.E.2d at 451.
40. Id. at 380, 718 S.E.2d at 451 (citing Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 397, 404, 417
S.E.2d 305, 309 (1992)).
20121
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the statements were admissible to rebut the allegation of "recent
fabrication" elicited by the cross-examination.41 The court, howev-
er, observed that the defendant "did not allege that [the plaintiff]
had crafted a new story at trial, but rather that [the plaintiff] had
been inconsistent with his story all along."42 Thus, while the
cross-examination regarding plaintiffs prior inconsistent state-
ments may have called into question his veracity, it was not ap-
propriate to use prior consistent statements for rehabilitation.43
In Anderson v. Commonwealth, a criminal case involving an al-
leged sexual assault, the supreme court provided additional guid-
ance on the admissibility of prior consistent statements.4 The vic-
tim in Anderson provided inconsistent statements regarding
whether she had seen-as opposed to heard-a gun she believed
had been held to her head during the assault. 5 At trial, the de-
fense put on evidence of her statement that she "saw a gun" in
order to impeach her testimony through a prior inconsistent
statement.46 Over the defense's objection, the prosecution then
put on testimony regarding the victim's prior consistent state-
41
ments regarding having heard a "click" that sounded like a gun.
In upholding the decision to admit the evidence," the supreme
court explained that there are two exceptions to the general rule
excluding prior consistent statements.49 The first is when a wit-
ness's credibility is attacked in a way that suggests "a motive to
falsify his testimony, such as bias, interest, corruption or rela-
tionship to a party or a cause, or that his testimony at trial is a
'recent fabrication' designed to serve such a motive."5° Under the
first exception, as discussed in the Ruhlin case,1 ' the "prior con-
sistent statement, to be admissible, must have been made before
the motive to falsify existed."52 The second exception arises when
41. See id. at 381, 718 S.E.2d at 452 (internal quotation marks omitted).
42. Id.
43. Id. at 382, 718 S.E.2d at 452.
44. See 282 Va. 457, 460-61, 717 S.E.2d 623, 624 (2011).
45. Id. at 461-63, 717 S.E.2d at 624-25.
46. See id. at 462-63, 717 S.E.2d at 625 (internal quotation marks omitted).
47. Id. at 463, 717 S.E.2d at 625-26 (internal quotation marks omitted).
48. Id., 717 S.E.2d at 626.
49. Id. at 463-64, 717 S.E.2d at 626 (citing Faison v. Hudson, 243 Va. 397, 404, 417
S.E.2d 305, 309 (1992)).
50. Id. at 464, 717 S.E.2d at 626.
51. See Ruhlin v. Samaan, 282 Va. 371, 381, 718 S.E.2d 447, 452 (2011).
52. Anderson, 282 Va. at 464, 717 S.E.2d at 626 (citing Ruhlin, 282 Va. at 380-81, 718
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the "opposing party has attempted to impeach the witness by of-
fering a prior inconsistent statement made by the witness."5 Ac-
cording to the court, the rationale behind the second exception is
that the fact finder "is entitled to consider both the fact that [the
witnessi uttered consistent statements, along with inconsistent
statements, and the circumstances in which each was made, in
determining the weight to be given to [the witness's] testimony."4
The court stressed that the second exception has never been sub-
ject to the condition that the prior consistent statement be made
when the witness had no motive to falsify his testimony.55 Consid-
ering that the defense attempted to impeach the victim with her
prior inconsistent statements, the court held that the trial court
properly allowed the testimony regarding her prior consistent
statements.56
C. Sanctions
The Supreme Court of Virginia has recently discussed a variety
of sanctions that can arise in litigation. The case of Northern Vir-
ginia Real Estate, Inc. v. Martins provided the supreme court
with another opportunity to address issues of retention of juris-
diction under Rule 1:1, as well as the apportionment of liability
for sanctions under Virginia Code section 8.01-271.1. 5 7 The case
arose out of a dispute over a listing agreement,"s and plaintiffs
brought claims for tortious interference, business conspiracy, and
defamation." In response to the plaintiffs' second amended com-
plaint, two of the defendants put forth affirmative defenses re-
garding both the absence of a contract between the plaintiffs and
the owner of the subject property as well as a lack of a reasonable
business expectancy to support the tortious interference claim
and sought a reply under Rule 3:11 and Rule 1:4(e).6" As the
S.E.2d at 451-52).
53. Id. (citing Ruhlin, 282 Va. at 380-81, 718 S.E.2d at 451-52).
54. Id. at 464-65, 717 S.E.2d at 626.
55. Id. at 465, 717 S.E.2d at 627.
56. See id. at 466, 717 S.E.2d at 627 (citing Creasy v. Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 470,
474, 389 S.E.2d 316, 318 (1990)),
57. 283 Va. 86, 101, 720 S.E.2d 121, 128 (2012).
58. Id. at 94-95, 720 S.E.2d at 124.
59. Id. at 94, 720 S.E.2d at 124.
60. Id. at 97, 720 S.E.2d at 126. According to Rule 3:11, "If a pleading, motion or af-
firmative defense sets up new matter and contains words expressly requesting a reply, the
adverse party shall within 21 days file a reply admitting or denying such new matter." VA.
2012]
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plaintiffs failed to reply to the affirmative defenses as requested,
they were deemed admitted prior to the trial.1
At trial, plaintiffs' case suffered from additional admissions by
one of the plaintiffs on the witness stand, as well as a lack of
proof regarding certain allegations made in the pleadings.2 Pre-
dictably, the defendants moved to strike at the close of the plain-
tiffs' evidence. Prior to a ruling on the defendants' motion to
strike, plaintiffs moved to nonsuit." The trial court granted the
motion for nonsuit, and the defendants stated their intention to
seek sanctions.65 The court then suspended the nonsuit order un-
til further order of court so that the parties could be heard on mo-
tions.6 Subsequently, the defendants followed through on their
motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs under section 8.01-
271.1.7 Finding that the plaintiffs' claims were filed out of a "vin-
dictive" desire to injure competitors, that the claims lacked a fac-
tual basis, and that the plaintiffs had pressed the tortious inter-
ference claim at trial despite the court's "devastating ruling" that
they had admitted an absence of contract and expectancy by fail-
ing to reply to the affirmative defense on the subject, the trial
court granted the defendants' motion and awarded sanctions
against both the plaintiffs and their counsel. 8
On appeal the plaintiffs argued that the trial court lacked ju-
risdiction to award sanctions because more than twenty-one days
had passed since the entry of the nonsuit order.6 9 As to the Rule
1:1 issue, the supreme court cited its previous decision in Super
Fresh Food Markets of Virginia, Inc. v. Ruffin," which held that a
circuit court may avoid the application of the twenty-one day rule
by including specific language in the order to indicate that it re-
SUP. CT. R. pt. 3, R. 3:11 (Repl. Vol. 2012). Rule 1:4(e) provides that "[a]n allegation of fact
in a pleading that is not denied by the adverse party's pleading, when the adverse party is
required by these Rules to file such pleading, is deemed to be admitted." Id. R. 1:4 (Repl.
Vol. 2012).
61. 283 Va. at 97, 729 S.E.2d at 126.
62. Id. at 97-98, 720 S.E.2d at 126-27.
63. Id. at 98, 720 S.E.2d at 127.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 98-99, 720 S.E.2d at 127.
67. Id. at 99, 770 S.E.2d at 127.
68. Id. at 99-100, 107, 720 S.E.2d at 127, 131.
69. Id. at 103, 720 S.E.2d at 129.
70. 263 Va. 555, 561 S.E.2d 734 (2002).
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tains jurisdiction to address matters still pending. 71 Finding that
the trial court had properly suspended the nonsuit order so that
the issue of sanctions could be considered, the supreme court re-
jected the Rule 1:1 argument. 2
On the issue of the propriety of the sanctions themselves, the
court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in im-
posing them against both the plaintiffs and their attorneys." The
defendants also contested the joint and several liability on the
sanctions award by arguing that the trial court should have ap-
portioned the award between the defendants and their attorneys
based on relative fault.74 In rejecting that argument, the supreme
court noted that the trial court properly found both the plaintiffs
and their counsel to be culpable, and in the absence of any evi-
dence to demonstrate the proper allocation of fault between them,
joint and several liability was appropriate.75
In Nolte v. MT Technology Enterprises, LLC, a case arising out
of a contentious business dispute,7" the Supreme Court of Virginia
addressed the propriety of sanctions for discovery abuse." As a
sanction for the repeated failure of several defendants to comply
with discovery requests and the court's orders compelling discov-
ery, the trial court prohibited certain defendants from opposing
the plaintiffs claims and from introducing any evidence to sup-
port the defenses defendants had raised in their pleading and
granted a default judgment against another defendant who,
among other things, had refused to appear for his deposition."8
In reviewing the trial court's sanctions order for abuse of dis-
cretion, the supreme court noted that Rule 4:12(b)(2) allows a
court to impose sanctions "as are just" to address the failure to
obey a discovery order, including "[a]n order refusing to allow the
disobedient party to support or oppose designated claims or de-
71. 283 Va. at 104, 720 S.E.2d at 130 (quoting 263 Va. at 563-64, 561 S.E.2d at 739).
72. Id. at 105, 720 S.E.2d at 130.
73. Id. at 107, 720 S.E.2d at 131.
74. Id. at 101, 720 S.E.2d at 128.
75. Id. at 114, 116, 720 S.E.2d at 135-36. Recognizing that concerns over the attor-
ney-client privilege may lead to a reluctance to put on evidence of relative fault between a
party and its attorney, the court noted that in such situations it would be appropriate for
the lawyer to withdraw from the representation and for the party and lawyer to retain
separate counsel to pursue the argument. Id. at 115, 720 S.E.2d at 136.
76. 284 Va. 80, 83-85, 726 S.E.2d 339, 341-42 (2012).
77. Id. at 92, 726 S.E.2d at 347.
78. Id. at 93-95, 726 S.E.2d at 346-48.
20121
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fenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in
evidence" or "[a]n order . . . rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party. 7' The court then ruled that the
trial court's choice of sanctions was not impermissible under the
rule and was supported by the evidence before it.8" The supreme
court did, however, take issue with the scope of the trial court's
application of the awarded sanction,8 Specifically, the supreme
court found it "too harsh" and an abuse of discretion for the trial
court to forbid the defendants from cross-examining witnesses
and from putting on any evidence regarding the amount of dam-
ages sought by the plaintiffs. 2 The court remanded the case for
additional proceedings on damages. 3
79. Id. at 93, 726 S.E.2d at 346-47 (third alteration in original) (quoting VA. SUP. CT,
R. pt. 5, R. 4:12(b)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 4:12(b)(2)
states as follows:
If a party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person des-
ignated under Rule 4:5(b)(6) or 4:6(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to
obey an order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under
subdivision (a) of this Rule or Rule 4:10, the court in which the action is pend-
ing may make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among oth-
ers the following:
(A) An order that the matters regarding which the order was made or any
other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the purposes of the
action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) An order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or oppose
designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designat-
ed matters in evidence;
(C) An order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, or staying further pro-
ceedings until the order is obeyed, or dismissing the action or proceeding or
any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default against the disobedient
party;
(D) In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an order
treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders except an order
to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) Where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule 4:10(a) re-
quiring him to produce another for examination, such orders as are listed in
paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless the party failing to
comply shows that he is unable to produce such person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court shall re-
quire the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising him or both
to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the fail-
ure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that
other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
R. 4:12(b)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
80. 284 Va. at 94, 726 S.E.2d at 347.
81. Id. at 94-95, 726 S.E.2d at 347-48.
82. Id. at 95, 726 S.E.2d at 347-48.
83, Id. at 98, 726 S.E.2d at 349.
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The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Landrum v. Chippen-
ham and Johnston-Willis Hospitals, Inc. that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony of a party's
expert witness in a medical malpractice case for failure to comply
with the court's orders regarding expert disclosure. 4 The plaintiff,
represented by a lead counsel who was an out-of-state attorney
admitted pro hac vice, failed to provide a complete expert disclo-
sure under Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) according to the court's pretrial
scheduling order." Following the defendant hospital's motion to
exclude the plaintiffs expert and motion for summary judgment
based on this deficiency, 6 the out-of-state counsel submitted an
expert report but failed to supplement his expert interrogatory
answer. 7 At the hearing on the defendant's motion, the trial court
granted the plaintiff additional time to supplement the designa-
tion to conform with Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A)(i).s A day before the court-
ordered deadline, the plaintiffs out-of-state counsel filed an ex-
pert designation that was not signed by local counsel in accord-
ance with Rule 1A:4(2). 9 The defendant hospital again moved to
exclude the expert and for summary judgment."0 Shortly before
the hearing on the defendant's second motion, the plaintiff re-
filed the supplemental designation with local counsel's signa-
ture. 1 The trial court granted the defendant's motion to exclude
and motion for summary judgment, noting the series of late fil-
ings and the court's clear instructions that the supplemental des-
ignation had to be filed properly. 2
84. 282 Va. 346, 349, 717 S.E.2d 134, 138 (2011).
85. Id. at 349-50, 117 S.E.2d at 135. According to Rule 4:1(b)(4)(A), a party:
may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person
whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the
subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the
substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.
VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 5, R.4:1(b)(4)(A)(i) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
86. 282 Va. at 350, 717 S.E.2d at 135.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 350-51, 717 S.E.2d at 136. Rule 1A:4(2) states in relevant part that "[any
pleading or other paper required to be served (whether relating to discovery or otherwise)
shall be invalid unless it is signed by local counsel." VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 1A, R. 1A:4(2)
(Repl. Vol. 2012).
90. 282 Va. at 351, 717 S.E.2d at 136.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 351-52, 717 S.E.2d at 136.
2012]
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On appeal, the plaintiff contended that the trial court abused
its discretion in excluding the expert because Rule 4:1(g) states
that if a discovery response is not signed it "shall be stricken un-
less it is signed promptly after the omission is called to the atten-
tion" of the responding party, and the supplemental designation
was refiled with local counsel's signature shortly after the plain-
tiff raised the matter.9 The supreme court rejected that argu-
ment, noting that Rule 4: 1(g) was not applicable because the orig-
inal designation was signed by counsel of record (the out-of-state
attorney), but the designation was simply without legal effect be-
cause it was not signed by local counsel.94 Thus, the trial court's
order on supplementation of the expert disclosure was disobeyed,
and the infraction could not be corrected by a refiling. 5
Plaintiffs next argument was that the court abused its discre-
tion by excluding the expert because the plaintiff did not suffer
prejudice by virtue of the Rule 1A:4 violation.96 The court held
that prejudice was irrelevant because the trial court excluded the
expert for failure to comply with its pretrial order-not for violat-
ing Rule 1A:4. 9' According to the court, Rule 4:12(b)(2) provides a
trial court with the authority to sanction a party for failure to
obey a discovery order, and nothing in the rule requires a finding
of prejudice prior to imposing the sanction. 9 Thus, the court held
that the trial court had properly considered the matter and did
not abuse its discretion in excluding the expert. 9 It is also im-
portant to note that in assessing abuse of discretion, the supreme
court expressly adopted a definition that had been conceived by
the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit as follows:
An abuse of discretion ... can occur in three principal ways: when a
relevant factor that should have been given significant weight is not
considered; when an irrelevant or improper factor is considered and
given significant weight; and when all proper factors, and no im-
proper ones, are considered, but the court, in weighing those factors,
commits a clear error of judgment.
100
93. Id. at 353, 717 S.E.2d at 137 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 4, R. 4:1(g) (Repl. Vol.
2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
94. Id. at 354-55, 717 S.E.2d at 137-38.
95. Id. at 355, 717 S.E.2d at 138.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 4, R. 4:12(b)(2) (Repl. Vol. 2012)).
99. Id. at 355-56, 717 S. E.2d at 138-39.
100. Id. at 352-53, 717 S.E,2d at 137 (alteration in original) (quoting Kern v. TXO
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D. "Due Diligence" in Service of Process
In Bowman v. Concepcion, the Supreme Court of Virginia ad-
dressed the requirement under Virginia Code section 8.01-275.1
to effect service on a defendant within twelve months of filing
suit, whether the twelve-month period was subject to extension
for good cause, and whether the plaintiff had exercised due dili-
gence in arranging for service. 1' Bowman involved a medical
malpractice claim timely filed on February 5, 2009.102 On Febru-
ary 5, 2010, plaintiffs counsel filed a motion requesting an exten-
sion until July 1, 2010, for "good cause," which was heard by the
circuit court in an ex parte proceeding and granted in an order
entered that same day."3 The plaintiff thereafter served the de-
fendant physician on March 30, 2010."' The defendant moved to
dismiss under section 8.01-275.1 on the grounds that he had not
been served within twelve months of filing and that the plaintiff
could not show that she had exercised due diligence to have time-
ly service made.' The defendant also argued that the extension
order was void, or at least voidable, and the court applied the
wrong standard by addressing "good cause" rather than "due dili-
gence. '' 0°
In response to the motion to dismiss, the plaintiff explained
that the suit had been filed to preserve the statute of limitations,
but at the time of filing, she had not obtained the medical certifi-
cation required by Virginia Code section 8.01-20.1 and that, alt-
hough she diligently had sought an expert to review the medical
records and provide the requisite certification, she had not been
Prod. Corp., 738 F.2d 968, 970 (8th Cir. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. See 283 Va. 552, 555-56, 722 S.E.2d 260, 262 (2012). Section 8.01-275.1 states as
follows:
Service of process in an action or suit within twelve months of commence-
ment of the action or suit against a defendant shall be timely as to that de-
fendant. Service of process on a defendant more than twelve months after the
suit or action was commenced shall be timely upon a finding by the court that
the plaintiff exercised due diligence to have timely service made on the de-
fendant.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-275.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
102. 283 Va. at 556, 722 S.E.2d at 262.
103. See id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 556-57, 722 S.E.2d at 262-63.
106. See id. at 557, 722 S.E.2d at 263 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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able to do so prior to the twelve-month deadline. 17 It was not dis-
puted that the plaintiff did not attempt to serve the defendant
physician during the twelve months even though he resided in
the jurisdiction the entire time.' 8 The trial court granted the mo-
tion to dismiss and ruled that the extension order was void be-
cause the court did not address the issue of due diligence, and
there was no other statutory authority for an extension. 9 The
trial court further noted that due diligence pertains to efforts to
have the defendant served, not to obtain a medical report."0
On appeal, the supreme court reviewed the language of section
8.01-20.1 and Rule 3:5(e)"' and agreed with the circuit court that
"no statutory authority exists that would permit a court to grant
prospectively an extension of time beyond one year from com-
mencement of an action for service of process on a defendant.")12
The court, however, held that the extension order was not void for
that reason but instead was improper because it failed to address
the due diligence issue."3 On that point, the court held that the
effort expended by the plaintiff to obtain the medical certification
was not "due diligence" to obtain service of process." 4 In so hold-
107. See id. at 557, 564, 722 S.E.2d at 263, 267. Virginia Code section 8.01-20.1 states
as follows in relevant part:
Every motion for judgment, counter claim, or third party claim in a medical
malpractice action, at the time the plaintiff requests service of process upon a
defendant, or requests a defendant to accept service of process, shall be
deemed a certification that the plaintiff has obtained from an expert witness
whom the plaintiff reasonably believes would qualify as an expert witness...
a written opinion signed by the expert witness that, based upon a reasonable
understanding of the facts, the defendant for whom service of process has
been requested deviated from the applicable standard of care and the devia-
tion was a proximate cause of the injuries claimed....
-.. If the plaintiff did not obtain a necessary certifying expert opinion at the
time the plaintiff requested service of process on a defendant as required un-
der this section, the court shall impose sanctions according to the provisions
of § 8.01-271.1 and may dismiss the case with prejudice.
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-20.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2012). Rule 3:5(e) of the su-
preme court further states that "[n]o order, judgment or decree shall be entered against a
defendant who was served with process more than one year after the institution of the ac-
tion against that defendant unless the court finds as a fact that the plaintiff exercised due
diligence to have timely service on that defendant." VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 3, R. 3:5 (Repl. Vol.
2012).
108. See Bowman, 283 Va. at 556-58, 722 S.E.2d at 262-64.
109. See id. at 558-59, 722 S.E.2d at 263-64.
110. Id. at 558, 722 S.E.2d at 263.
111. See id. at 559, 722 S.E.2d at 264.
112. Id. at 561, 722 S.E.2d at 265.
113. See id.
114. Id. at 563, 722 S.E.2d at 266.
[Vol. 47:113
CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
ing, the court noted that the plaintiff was not without procedural
remedy to address her inability to obtain the medical certifica-
tion, as "she could have taken a nonsuit as a matter of right.
115
E. Closing Argument
The matter of Wakole v. Barber provided the Supreme Court of
Virginia with an opportunity to address the boundaries of argu-
ing for itemized damages at closing."6 In this personal injury law-
suit, the plaintiff provided evidence of roughly $5000 in medical
expenses resulting from an auto accident." The plaintiff also pre-
sented evidence related to her pain, suffering, and inconven-
ience."' During closing argument, plaintiff's attorney argued for a
total of $50,000 in damages and presented a chart to aid the jury
in its damages calculation-including medical bills, inconven-
ience, future medical expenses, and pain and suffering."9 The jury
awarded $30,000.12
On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred by
allowing the chart to be presented during closing'21 and that doing
so ran afoul of the court's previous decision in Certified T. V. &
Appliance Co. v. Harrington, which held that "allowing plaintiffs
counsel to make an argument to the jury based upon a 'daily or
other fixed basis' would permit the plaintiff to present that which
is not in evidence and invade the province of the jury."'22 Review-
ing the Certified TV. decision, the court explained that
[t]he danger against which the Court sought to guard was an argu-
ment placed before the jury that was not based on the evidence and
further was based on a flawed premise that pain and suffering is
constant from individual to individual and the degree of pain is the
123
same daily.
115. Id. at 564, 722 S.E.2d at 267.
116. 283 Va. 488, 490, 722 S.E.2d 238, 239 (2012).
117, Id. at 491, 722 S.E.2d at 239.
118. See id.
119. Id. at 492, 722 S.E.2d at 240.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. (quoting Certified T.V. & Appliance Co. v. Harrington, 201 Va. 109, 115, 109
S.E.2d 126, 131 (1959)).
123. Id. at 493-94, 722 SE2d at 241 (citing Certified TV, 201 Va. at 115, 109 S.E.2d
at 131).
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The supreme court distinguished Certified T.V., however, stating
that counsel's argument in the instant matter did not assign a
per diem rate for non-economic damages but rather assigned a to-
tal amount to each category.'24 The court then held that
as long as there is evidence to support an award of non-economic
damages, plaintiff is allowed to break the lump sum amount into its
component parts and argue a 'fixed amount' for each element of
damages claimed as long as the amount is not based on a per diem or
other fixed basis. 28
In reaching this conclusion, the court also rejected the defend-
ant's argument that allowing for such argument would violate
Virginia Code section 8.01-379.1, noting that nothing in the stat-
ute requires argument for the total damages amount to be in one
lump sum.126
F. Preservation of Error
Recently, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed preserva-
tion of error in a number of cases. In Galumbeck v. Lopez,"s7 dur-
ing the trial of a wrongful death claim,128 the trial court, over the
defendant doctor's objection, disallowed the use of a surgical log
offered into evidence by the doctor.9 On appeal, the supreme
court refused to consider the defendant's substantive arguments
regarding the admissibility of the log13° and held that the defend-
ant had waived the arguments by failing to present a sufficient
record to permit review."' The defendant was not able to present
an adequate record because his counsel's objections were made in
a sidebar conference off the record. 2 Although the defendant lat-
er submitted a proffer on the record, that submission was made
after court had adjourned for the day and outside the presence of
opposing counsel.'33 In holding that the proffer was inadequate to
124. Id. at 493-94, 722 S.E.2d at 241.
125. Id. at 494, 722 S.E.2d at 241.
126. Id. at 490-91, 495, 722 S.E.2d at 239, 242.
127. 283 Va. 500, 722 S.E.2d 551 (2012).
128. Id. at 503, 722 S.E.2d at 553.
129. See id. at 503-04, 722 S.E.2d at 553.
130. See id. at 507, 722 S.E.2d at 554.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 508, 722 S.E.2d at 555.
133. Id.
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preserve the error, the court noted that there was no mutual
stipulation or acquiescence by the opposing party.'
As to another evidentiary ruling regarding the board certifica-
tion status of a doctor in the defendant's practice, the court again
found the defendant had not preserved the issue.3 6 Although the
defendant had put the matter before the court in a pretrial mo-
tion in limine, he did not seek a ruling on the motion,' 7 and when
the evidence was introduced at trial, he made his objection off the
record in a sidebar conference.'
The supreme court also addressed preservation of error in
Brandon v. Cox."' In this landlord-tenant case arising out of a
disputed security deposit, 40 the court ruled that the tenant failed
to preserve her argument for appeal and therefore waived it. '
The tenant originally filed a warrant in debt against her land-
lords over the security deposit and lost in general district court.'4 2
She also lost the subsequent appeal of that ruling to the circuit
court.1 ' Following the circuit court decision, the tenant filed a
motion for reconsideration and a supporting memorandum in
which she made all of the arguments that she later made on ap-
peal to the supreme court.'44 She failed, however, to seek a ruling
on the motion from the trial court before pursuing the appeal.'
4
'
In addressing whether the tenant had preserved her argu-
ments, the court noted that Virginia Code section 8.01-384(A) and
Rule 3:25 "have been interpreted to mean that [a] party must
state the grounds for an objection so that the trial judge may un-




137. Id. at 508-09, 722 S.E.2d at 555.
138. Id. at 509, 722 S.E.2d at 555-56. The Galumbeck court also addressed whether it
was an error for the trial court to fail to grant a mistrial for certain alleged juror miscon-
duct. See id. at 506, 722 S.E.2d at 554. In holding that there was no error, the court stated
that a juror is presumed to be impartial and that the defendant had not met his burden to
prove prejudicial misconduct. Id. at 506-07, 722 S.E.2d at 554.
139. 284 Va. 251, 253, 726 S.E.2d 298, 299 (2012).
140. See id. at 254, 726 S.E.2d at 299.
141. Id. at 256-57, 726 S.E.2d at 301.
142. See id. at 254, 726 S.E.2d at 299.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id., 726 S.E.2d at 299-300.
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cide."'4' The court held that the tenant failed to preserve her ar-
guments in the trial record. '47 Furthermore, in a matter of first
impression, the court decided "whether merely filing a motion in
the clerk's office of a circuit court properly preserves a litigant's
argument for appeal when the record fails to reflect that the trial
court had the opportunity to rule upon that motion."'148 According
to the court, because the preservation rules are designed "to en-
sure that the trial court has the opportunity to rule upon an ar-
gument [being appealed], the record must affirmatively demon-
strate that the trial court was made aware of the argument.' 49
Because the record failed to demonstrate that the motion for re-
consideration was brought to the trial court's attention, the ar-
guments contained within the motion were waived. 5°
G. Relief from Default Judgment
In Specialty Hospitals of Washington, LLC v. Rappahannock
Goodwill Industries, Inc., the Supreme Court of Virginia evaluat-
ed whether a trial court abused its discretion in denying a motion
for relief from default judgment under Rule 3:19(d)(1)."' Specialty
Hospitals, a foreign corporation, was served properly through the
secretary of the Commonwealth but failed to file any response to
the complaint."2 Rappahannock Goodwill subsequently moved for
default judgment, which the trial court granted.1 5 3 Only then,
within twenty-one days of the default judgment order, did Spe-
146. Id. at 255, 726 S.E.2d at 300 (alteration in original) (quoting Scialdone v. Com-
monwealth, 279 Va. 422, 437, 689 S.E.2d 716, 724 (2010)) (internal quotations omitted).
147. Id. at 257, 726 S.E.2d at 301.
148. Id. at 256, 726 S.E.2d at 301.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 256-57, 726 S.E.2d at 301.
151. 283 Va. 348, 351, 722 S.E.2d 557, 557 (2012). Rule 3:19(d)(1) states as follows:
During the period provided by Rule 1:1 for the modification, vacation or sus-
pension of a judgment, the court may by written order relieve a defendant of
a default judgment after consideration of the extent and causes of the de-
fendant's delay in tendering a responsive pleading, whether service of process
and actual notice of the claim were timely provided to the defendant, and the
effect of the delay upon the plaintiff. Relief from default may be conditioned
by the court upon the defendant reimbursing any extra costs and fees, includ-
ing attorney's fees, incurred by the plaintiff solely as a result of the delay in
the filing of a responsive pleading by the defendant.
VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 3, R. 3:19(d)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
152. Id. at 351-52, 722 S.E.2d at 558.
153. Id. at 352, 722 S.E.2d at 558.
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cialty appear by filing a motion under Rule 3:19(d)(1) to set aside
the judgment--claiming that service was defective and that it
was not the proper defendant.' Following an ore tenus hearing,
the trial court denied Specialty's motion finding that service was
proper and that Specialty failed to submit any reasonable excuse
or cause for its failure to file a timely response.' On appeal, Spe-
cialty argued that the trial court erred by failing to consider all of
the factors set forth in Rule 3:19(d)(1) for setting aside default
judgment and by failing to make a specific finding of actual notice
of the suit on the part of the defendant.'56 The supreme court re-
jected Specialty's assertion and held that a finding of actual no-
tice was not required under the rule."7 The court further declined
to impose a requirement that the trial court set out specific find-
ings regarding each of the factors in Rule 3:19(d)(1)." '
H. Tolling of Statute of Limitations
Responding to certified questions from the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in Casey v. Merck & Co., the supreme court
addressed whether Virginia's statute of limitations applicable to
product liability actions tolled by virtue of a pending putative
class action in a foreign jurisdiction."9 The court first made clear
that "there is no authority in Virginia jurisprudence for the equi-
table tolling of a statute of limitations based upon the pendency
of a putative class action in another jurisdiction."'60 Next the court
addressed whether tolling could occur by virtue of section 8.01-
229(E)(1), 161 which provides that
if any action is commenced within the prescribed limitation period
and for any cause abates or is dismissed without determining the
merits, the time such action is pending shall not be computed as part
of the period within which such action may be brought, and another
action may be brought within the remaining period.
154. Id.
155. See id. at 352-53, 722 S.E.2d at 558-59.
156. Id. at 354, 722 S.E.2d at 559,
157. Id. at 356, 722 S.E.2d at 560.
158. Id. at 357, 722 S.E.2d at 561.
159. 283 Va. 411, 414-15, 722 S.E.2d 842, 844 (2012).
160. Id. at 461, 722 S.E.2d at 845.
161. Id.
162. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-229(E)(1) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2012).
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While recognizing that tolling under section 8.01-229(E)(1) can be
triggered by the filing of a case in a foreign jurisdiction, the court
explained that "the subsequently filed action must be filed by the
same party in interest on the same cause of action in the same
right."'63 In the case to which the questions pertain, the plaintiffs
were not named plaintiffs in the putative class action but instead
were merely members of the putative class.' According to the
supreme court, "In essence, to toll the statue of limitations, the
plaintiff in the first suit must have legal standing to assert the
rights that are at issue in the second lawsuit.""' Because there
was no identity of parties between the putative class action and
the subsequent suit, tolling under section 8.01-229(E)(1) did not
apply.166
I. Jury Instructions on Standing
The case of Cattano v. Bragg primarily involved the question of
whether a minority shareholder in a two-shareholder corporation
had standing to bring a derivative suit under Virginia Code sec-
tion 13.1-672.1 on behalf of the company against his fellow share-
holder.67 At issue was whether the minority shareholder "fairly
and adequately represent[ed] the interests of the corporation as
required by [statute].""' Among other things, the majority share-
holder contended that the trial court erred by failing to place the
issue of standing before the jury.'69 The supreme court, however,
noted that it "has never held that an issue of standing must be
163. 283 Va. at 417, 722 S.E.2d at 845.
164. Id., 722 S.E.2d at 845-46.
165. Id. at 418, 722 S.E.2d at 846.
166. See id. at 419, 722 S.E.2d at 846.
167. See 283 Va. 638, 643, 727 S.E.2d 625, 626 (2012).
168. Id. at 643, 727 S.E.2d at 627. Under section 13.1-672.1(A), a
shareholder shall not commence or maintain a derivative proceeding unless
the shareholder:
1. Was a shareholder of the corporation at the time of the act or omission
complained of;
2. Became a shareholder through transfer by operation of law from one who
was a shareholder at that time; or
3. Became a shareholder before public disclosure and without knowledge of
the act or omission complained of; and
4. Fairly and adequately represents the interests of the corporation in en-
forcing the right of the corporation.
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-672.1(A) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
169. 283 Va. at 649, 727 S.E.2d at 630.
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placed before a jury, and we do not rule on the issue now.' 7° In-
stead, the court focused on whether there was any factual dispute
to be resolved."' Finding that the facts pertaining to the issue of
fair and adequate representation were undisputed, the court up-
held the trial court's decision not to issue a jury instruction on the
matter of standing.'72
J. Use of Depositions at Trial
The case of Burns v. Gagnon, which primarily addressed sub-
stantive issues of liability and immunity on the part of a school
vice-principal for injuries sustained by a student in a fight that
occurred on school grounds, 3 also dealt with a procedural issue of
the admissibility of deposition testimony at trial.' In a previous
iteration of the litigation, which was brought by the plaintiff
against the vice-principal and the school board but subsequently
nonsuited, a student who had informed the vice-principal that a
potential fight was brewing was deposed. 7 ' At the trial of the in-
stant case, the former student's deposition was introduced under
Rule 4:7 over the plaintiffs objection because the witness was un-
available at the time due to military service. 70 On appeal, the
plaintiff contended that the deposition should not have been ad.
mitted because, among other things, the parties to the two cases
were different. 77 The supreme court rejected this argument, not-
ing that the same parties (plaintiff and vice-principal) were pre-
sent in the two cases, and "it did not matter that the other parties
changed.'78 Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in al-





173. See 283 Va. 657, 663, 727 S.E.2d 634, 638-39 (2012).
174. Id., 727 S.E.2d at 639.
175. Id. at 665-66 & n.3, 177 S.E.2d at 640 & n.3.
176. See id. at 680, 727 S.E,2d at 648.
177. Id. at 679, 727 S.E.2d at 647.
178. Id. at 680, 727 S.E.2d at 648.
179. Id.
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K. Offsetting Damages
In Askew v. Collins, the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed
damages offsets under Virginia Code section 8.01-35.1.s8° The
plaintiff in Askew sued a newspaper, a city, and a city employee
for defamation and conspiracy.' During the litigation, the plain-
tiff settled with the city and the newspaper, leaving Askew as the
sole remaining defendant at trial.'82 The jury returned a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, and Askew requested that the trial court re-
duce the judgment by the amount the plaintiff already had re-
ceived from settling with the co-defendants.8 The trial court de-
nied the request. 4 On appeal, Askew argued that the trial court
erred by failing to apply section 8.01-35.1 to reduce the judg-
ment. 5 The supreme court found the argument to be without
merit, for section 8.01-35.1 applies to cases where settlement is
made by one of two or more persons liable for the "same injury,"
whereas the injury for which Askew was found liable was the re-
sult of a separate and earlier incident of defamation than that of
which the settling defendants were accused.'8 '
180. See 283 Va. 482, 484, 722 S.E.2d 249, 250 (2012). Section 8.01-35.1 states as fol-
lows in relevant part:
A. When a release or a covenant not to sue is given in good faith to one of two
or more persons liable for the same injury to a person or property, or the
same wrongful death:
1. It shall not discharge any other person from liability for the injury,
property damage or wrongful death unless its terms so provide; but any
amount recovered against the other person or any one of them shall be re-
duced by any amount stipulated by the covenant or the release, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it, whichever is the greater. In determin-
ing the amount of consideration given for a covenant not to sue or release for
a settlement which consists in whole or in part of future payment or pay-
ments, the court shall consider expert or other evidence as to the present val-
ue of the settlement consisting in whole or in part of future payment or pay-
ments. A release or covenant not to sue given pursuant to this section shall
not be admitted into evidence in the trial of the matter but shall be consid-
ered by the court in determining the amount for which judgment shall be en-
tered ....
VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2012).




185. Id. at 485, 722 S.E.2d at 251.
186. Id. at 487, 722 S.E.2d at 251-52 (quoting VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-35.1(A)(1) (Repl.
Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2012)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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L. Necessary Parties
In Siska Revocable Trust v. Milestone Development, LLC, the
Supreme Court of Virginia held that "the necessary party doc-
trine does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction.""7 The Siska
case involved a derivative action stemming from a dispute be-
tween members of a limited liability company ("LLC")."8' At issue
in the trial court was whether the plaintiff member had standing
to sue on behalf of the LLC.' 9 Because the trial court found that
the plaintiff trust could not adequately represent the interests of
the other members due to longstanding antagonism between the
parties, 9 ' the complaint was dismissed."' 1 On appeal, one of the
defendants contended that the plaintiff had failed to name a nec-
essary party and that the appeal should be dismissed according-
ly. 9' On the issue of subject matter jurisdiction, the supreme
court held that "the necessary party doctrine does not implicate
subject matter jurisdiction," thereby effectively overruling the
case of Atkisson v. Wexford Associates, in which the supreme
court previously had held that a judgment made without the
presence of a necessary party was "absolutely void." '93 To the con-
trary, the court held that "Rule 3:12 was intended to govern the
exercise of trial court discretion in dealing with cases where a
necessary party has not been joined."'94 Nevertheless, the court
went on to hold that the LLC was a necessary party to the suit
that had not been joined.'95
M. Requests for Admission/Attorney Fees
In Piney Meeting House Investments, Inc. v. Hart, a case involv-
ing a claim for interference with an easement,"' the SupremeCourt of Virginia rejected an application of Rule 4:11's attorney
187. 282 Va. 169, 181, 715 S.E.2d 21, 27 (2011).
188. See id. at 172-73, 715 S.E.2d at 22.
189. See id., 715 S.E.2d at 22-23.
190. Id. at 172-73, 715 S.E.2d at 23.
191. Id. at 173, 715 S.E.2d at 23.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 176, 181, 715 S.E.2d at 25, 27 (citing Atkisson v. Wexford Assocs., 254 Va.
449, 456, 493 S.E.2d 524, 528 (1997)).
194. id. at 179, 715 S.E.2d at 26-27.
195. Id. at 182, 715 S.E.2d at 28.
196. 284 Va. 187, 190, 726 S.E.2d 319, 321 (2012).
2012]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
fee provision that would have created a massive loophole in the
well-established "American Rule" regarding attorney fee awards
in Virginia.'97 In Hart, the plaintiff propounded a request for ad-
mission as follows: "Admit that you have no defenses to the Plain-
tiffs claims."'98 The defendant denied the request and the matter
proceeded to a hearing before a commissioner in chancery who
ruled in favor of the plaintiff.'9 Upon review of the commission-
er's findings, the circuit court held that the plaintiff was entitled
to attorney fees under Rules 4:11(a) and 4:12(c) due to the denial
of the request for admission.00 On appeal the supreme court re-
versed, holding that the request for admission was not a proper
discovery request, and, therefore, the defendant had good reason
for its failure to admit the request.0 ' As a result, Rule 4:12(c) did
not require a fee award.2 2 In reversing the trial court, the su-
preme court also noted that adopting the plaintiffs position
"would render the American Rule of attorney's fees defunct in
many contested proceedings when the requesting party ultimate-
ly prevailed on the merits of a case.
III. AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF COURT
A. Adoption of the Virginia Rules of Evidence
By far the most significant and certainly the most eagerly an-
ticipated rules change this year was the adoption of the Virginia
197. See id. at 196-97, 726 S.E.2d at 324-25 (quoting VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 4, R. 4:12(c)
(Repl. Vol. 2012)). According to Rule 4:12(c):
If a party fails to admit the genuineness of any document or the truth of any
matter as requested under Rule 4:11, and if the party requesting the admis-
sions thereafter proves the genuineness of the document or the truth of the
matter, he may apply to the court for an order requiring the other party to
pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in making that proof, including
reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make the order unless it finds that
(1) the request was held objectionable pursuant to Rule 4:11(a), or (2) the
admission sought was of no substantial importance, or (3) the party failing to
admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might prevail on the matter,
or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to admit.
R. 4:12(c) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
198. 284 Va. at 192, 726 S.E.2d at 322 (internal quotation marks omitted).
199. See id. at 191-92, 726 S.E.2d at 321-22.
200. Id. at 192, 726 S.E.2d at 322.
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Rules of Evidence. Through an order dated June 1, 2012, effective
July 1, 2012, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted a compre-
hensive set of evidentiary rules, thus bringing Virginia in line
with the vast majority of other states in the country that have
adopted rules of evidence.204 A discussion of all the specific rules is
well beyond the scope of this article, but civil practitioners should
be aware that the Rules are now in place and state the law of evi-
dence in Virginia. The Rules of Evidence are found in part two of
the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia.0 5 Conveniently, the
Rules generally follow the numbering of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.2 6 Although the practical courtroom impact remains to be
seen, no substantive changes in Virginia evidence law were in-
tended by the adoption of the Rules. According to Rule 2:102, the
Rules "are adopted to implement established principles under the
common law and not to change any established case law rendered
prior to the adoption of the Rules.""2 7 Pre-adoption cases may be
considered in interpreting the Rules.
B. Petition for Rehearing
By order dated April 13, 2012, and effective June 13, 2012, the
Supreme Court of Virginia also substantially revised subsection
(f) of Rule 5:37 regarding procedures following the granting of a
petition for rehearing.2 9 The amendment to the Rule streamlines
the process following the granting of a petition by making further
briefing and oral argument discretionary. 10 Previously, when a
204. Order Amending Part Two, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (June 1, 2012)
(effective July 1, 2012), available at www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amendments/2012_
0601-Part_2_updated_2012_0618.pdf; see also Act of Apr. 9, 2012, ch. 688, 2012 Va. Acts
- ("[T]he Rules of Evidence shall be applicable in all proceedings held on or after the ef-
fective date of this act in any civil action or criminal case pending on that date or com-
menced thereafter... [i]n the event of any conflict between any enactment of the General
Assembly and any rule contained in the Rules of Evidence, the enactment of the General
Assembly shall control") (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-3 (Cum. Supp.
2012)).
205. VA. SuP. CT. R. pt. 2 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
206. Compare, e.g., FED. R. EViD. 401 (Definition of "relevant evidence"), and FED. R.
EVID. 802 (Hearsay Rule), with VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 2, R. 2:401 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (Definition
of "Relevant Evidence"), and id. R. 2:802 (Repl. Vol. 2012) (Hearsay Rule).
207. VA. SUP. CT. R. pt. 2, R. 2:102 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
208. Id.
209. Ordering Amending Rule 5:37, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Apr. 13,
2012) (effective June 13, 2012), available at www.courts.state.va.us/courts/scv/amend
mentstracked/rule 5 37 interlineated.pdf.
210. R. 5:37 (Repl. Vol. 2012).
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rehearing was granted, the respondent was permitted to file a re-
sponse brief and the matter was set for expedited oral argu-
ment.211 Now, the court "will determine whether any additional
briefing or argument is necessary" following the granting of the
rehearing.212 If the court decides to entertain additional briefing,
the court may direct the respondents to file a brief."3 After review
of the petition and respondent's brief, the court then "may set oral
argument on the petition for rehearing at the next available ses-
sion of the Court. Otherwise, the Court will issue a ruling on the
rehearing without further briefing or oral argument." '214
C. Notice of Appeal from Court of Appeals
Rule 5:14, governing notices of appeal in appeals to the Su-
preme Court of Virginia from the Court of Appeals of Virginia,
was amended effective March 1, 2012, to state that "[i]f a party is
granted a delayed appeal from the Court of Appeals, and has pre-
viously filed a notice of appeal with the Court of Appeals, no new
notice of appeal will be required. ' 215 The Rule also was amended
to speak of filing a notice of appeal in the passive voice ("a notice
of appeal is filed")216 to eliminate the language regarding filing of




The 2012 General Assembly amended Virginia Code sections
8.01-630 and 8.01-631 to subject only temporary injunctions-
rather than both temporary and permanent injunctions as be-
211. See R. 5:37(o (Repl. Vol. 2011), amended by R. 5:37(f) (Repl. Vol. 2012) (amending
order dated Apr. 13, 2012).
212. Id. R. 5:37(f) (Repl. Vol. 2012).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Order Amending Rule 5:14, Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia (Dec. 22, 2011)
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fore-to the potential of having to post a court-ordered bond."'
The amendment to section 8.01-631 does, however, allow that,
when "an appeal is taken from an interlocutory order or final
judgment granting, dissolving, or denying a permanent injunc-
tion, and while the appeal is pending, the trial court ... may sus-
pend, modify, restore, or grant an injunction" while the appeal is
pending upon terms such as posting a bond.21
B. School Records as Evidence
Through amendment to Virginia Code section 8.01-390.1, the
legislature greatly expanded the admissibility of school records.
Whereas the statute previously had addressed the admissibility
of school records "relating to attendance, transcripts or grades" in
matters "involving the custody of that minor or the termination of
parental rights of that minor's parents," with the omission of that
limiting language,22 the General Assembly amended the statute
to allow for the admissibility of a minor's school records that are
"material and otherwise admissible . . . in any matter," provided
that the records are authenticated by the custodian as being true
and accurate copies.22
C. Garnishments
The 2012 General Assembly amended Virginia Code section
8.01-511 to provide that costs incurred by a judgment creditor af-
ter entry of the judgment that are paid to a clerk, sheriff, or pro-
cess server (which shall not exceed that charged by the sheriff)
are chargeable against the judgment debtor unless chargeable to
the creditor under Virginia Code section 8.01-475.221 Such previ-
ous costs of the creditor may be included in the garnishment
218. Act of Mar. 6, 2012, ch. 77, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.01-630, -631, and -676.1 (Cum. Supp. 2012)). Section 8.01-676.1 also was
amended to state that its terms for security for appeals apply to injunction bonds under
section 8.01-631. Id.
219. Id.
220. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-390.1 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
221. Act of Apr. 4, 2012, ch. 499, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-390.1 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
222. Act of Mar. 30, 2012, ch. 409, 2012 Va. Acts __ (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-511 (Cum. Supp. 2012)); Act of Mar. 6, 2012, ch. 127, 2012 Va. Acts __ (codi-
fied as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-511 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
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summons.22 The General Assembly also corrected the form of
garnishment summons to state that the homestead exemption
"may not be claimed in certain cases such as payment of spousal
or child support."224 The notice previously addressed payment of
rent or services of a laborer or mechanic.225 Lastly, the General
Assembly amended section 8.01-511 of the code to provide that if
the debtor does not reside in the jurisdiction where the judgment
was entered, the creditor may institute garnishment proceedings
in the city or county where the debtor does reside, and the court
of that jurisdiction may issue an execution upon the judgment,
provided the creditor files an abstract of judgment, pays the req-
uisite fees, and files any release or satisfaction of judgment both
in the judgment court and the execution court.226 In addition, the
General Assembly also amended the statute to allow for a gar-
nishment to be issued without the debtor's Social Security num-
ber upon a representation by the creditor that a good faith, but
unsuccessful effort, was made to secure the number.227
D. Confession of Judgment
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-435
to allow for the appointment of substitute attorneys-in-fact for
purposes of confessing judgment on a note or bond.22 The substi-
tute must be specifically named in an instrument that is recorded
in the clerk's office where the judgment is to be confessed accord-
ing to the note or bond.229 If the instrument lacks a notice to in-
form the debtor that a substitute attorney-in-fact may be ap-
pointed, the person appointing the substitute must send notice of
the appointment to the debtor's last known address by certified
mail within ten days of the recording of the substitution.23°
223. Ch. 409, 2012 Va. Acts; ch. 127, 2012 Va. Acts _.
224. Act of Feb. 28, 2012, ch. 23, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-512.4 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
225. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-512.4 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
226. Act of Mar. 13, 2012, ch. 251, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-511 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
227. Id.
228. Act of February 28, 2012, ch. 31, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA.
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E. Lease Copies in Unlawful Detainer Actions
Through chapter 788 of the Acts of Assembly, the General As-
sembly made a number of amendments to various statutes per-
taining to landlord-tenant law." ' Of interest procedurally, Virgin-
ia Code section 8.01-126 was amended to state that a plaintiff in
an unlawful detainer case may submit into evidence a copy or
print-out of the original lease, as long as the plaintiff provides an
affidavit or sworn testimony that the document submitted is a
true and accurate copy of the original.232
F. Court Distribution of Funds
Through chapter 43 of the 2012 Acts of Assembly, the General
Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-601 to increase
from $15,000 to $25,000 the amount that may be paid into the
circuit court and which the court may pay out in accordance with
the statute.233 The same increase also was applied to the threshold
for certain fiduciary accountings.234
G. Appellee Damages
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-682
to clarify that damages in the form of interest to be awarded to an
appellee in the case of an affirmation of a judgment runs from the
date of filing the notice of appeal to the date the court issues its
mandate. 235 The end of the interest period previously had been
triggered on "affirmance." 236
H. Exemption for Jury Service
The General Assembly amended Virginia Code section 8.01-
341.1 to add members of the armed services or the diplomatic
231. See Act of Apr. 18, 2012, ch. 788, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of VA. CODE ANN.).
232. Id.
233. Act of Mar. 1, 2012, ch. 43, 2012 Va. Acts (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-606 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
234. Id.
235. Act of Mar. 1, 2012, ch. 58, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-682 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
236. Id.
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service of the United States who will be serving outside of the
United States to the list of individuals who may be exempted
211from jury service upon request.
237. Act of Mar. 6, 2012, ch. 98, 2012 Va. Acts - (codified as amended at VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-341.1 (Cum. Supp. 2012)).
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